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neighbor
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ABSTRACT
One of the major challenges for today’s wireless communications is to
meet the growing demand for supporting an increasing diversity of wireless
applications with limited spectrum resource. In cooperative communications
and networking, users share resources and collaborate in a distributed
approach, similar to entities of active social groups in self organizational
communities. Users’ information may be shared by the user and also by the
cooperative users, in distributed transmission.

Cooperative communications

and networking is a fairly new communication paradigm that promises
significant capacity and multiplexing gain increase in wireless networks.
This research will provide a cooperative relay selection framework that
exploits the similarity of cognitive radio networks to social networks. It offers a
multi-hop, reputation-based power control game for routing.

In this

dissertation, a social network model provides a humanistic approach to
predicting relay selection and network analysis in cognitive radio networks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The recent increase in wireless technology has led to much research
related to spectrum leasing, resource allocation, prioritized traffic, and
numerous other areas.

Several solutions to these areas involve using

cooperative communication among various wireless devices.

Cooperative

communication occurs in a multi-agent environment where nodes, often called
users, cooperate with one another in order to improve their performance and
that of the overall network, while maintaining power efficiency and reducing
delay. Cooperative communication has potential applications in many different
types of networks, including cellular, ad-hoc, and cognitive networks.
One of the major challenges for today’s wireless communications is to
meet the growing demand for supporting an increasing diversity of wireless
applications with limited spectrum resource.

Traditional wireless networks

have predominantly used direct point-to-point (one-to-one) or point-tomultipoint (one-to-many) topologies.

In cooperative communications and

networking, users share resources and collaborate in a distributed approach,
similar to entities of active social groups in self organizational communities.
Users’ information may be shared by the user and also by the cooperative
users, in distributed transmission. This is different from conventional point-topoint communications. Cooperative communications and networking is a fairly
new

communication

paradigm

that

promises

multiplexing gain increase in wireless networks.
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significant

capacity

and

Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been well recognized for their
ability to exploit the mutual beneficial relationship among users, distinguished
here as primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs), to facilitate cooperative
communication.

Considerable research has been conducted on CRNs in

relation to developing hardware, algorithms, and protocols that are needed for
dynamic spectrum access (DSA) capable cognitive networks. However, there
are fewer that address its network setup problem with emphasis on multi-hop
infrastructures.

More specifically, there are fewer proposed solutions to

determine cooperative relay selection in these types of networks.
This research will provide a cooperative relay selection framework that
exploits the similarity of cognitive radio networks to social networks. It offers a
multi-hop, reputation-based power control game for routing.

In this

dissertation, a social network model provides a humanistic approach to
predicting relay selection and network analysis in cognitive radio networks.
1.1. General Context of Research
1.1.1.Use Cases of Cognitive Radio Networks
Cognitive radio technology has been exploited in many real world
applications.

These applications include CR-enabled vehicles, emergency,

military, and cellular networks, multimedia, and sentient spaces. CR-enabled
vehicle (CRVs), as discussed by Felice et al. in [22], have “enabled a new class
of in-car entertainment systems and enhanced the ability of emergency
responders using opportunistic spectrum usage enabled by CR technology”.
These vehicles are capable of using systems outside of the IEEE 802.11p
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specified standard band. Additionally, they have enhanced features for drivers’
safety, traffic monitoring, and in-car streaming video entertainment options.
Public safety and military users have direct applications for cognitive
radios.

In these markets, situation awareness is critical.

Entities in these

networks rely on Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and other instantaneous
data to assist with disasters and other operations.

Awareness of the user’s

physical setting in both space and time may diminish uncertainty and
encourage better situation-based radio resource management [23]. Here, users
may be first responders, soldiers, or other government personnel.
Another emerging consumer market are sentient spaces. This refers to
environments where a wide variety of wireless products and services work
together in a single location (i.e. a home, business, or apartment building).
Often a diversity of cellular (e.g. 3G, 4G), broadcast (e.g. WiFi, Bluetooth), and
broadband (e.g. WiMAX) radio resources are available in these environments.
This could be applied to both elder care and child care.

According to [23],

sentient homes may include video cameras and voice recognition to assist
elderly tenants in remembering to take their prescriptions, enabling home
safety, and even turning off the stove.
1.1.2.Potential Correlation of CRNs to Social Networks
Cognitive radio networks are ideal communication systems for the
aforementioned use cases because they are able to perform dynamic spectrum
allocation and adapt their transmission and reception parameters, similar to
the adaptive behavior of social entities.

3

Cognitive radio networks aim to

stimulate interaction between a primary transmitter and the intended primary
receiver through secondary users, just as online communities, such as
Facebook, aim to stimulate social interaction among friends.

The users of

CRNs are capable of sensing active and inactive frequency channels, as well as,
determining neighboring users to assist with cooperative relay.

Similarly,

Facebook users have established friends and are able to detect connections to
other individuals and groups by analyzing relationships and other shared
links. Cognitive users may share channel experience, interaction history, and
path data, while users of online communities may share artefacts such as
photos, videos, and games.
1.2. Problem Statement
This research examines the applicability of social networking and social
capital theories in the context of cognitive radio networks’ ability to form
networks that improve the overall utility for primary users and to predict users’
intentions in network formation, a technique that could be employed in urgent
conditions, emergency situations and various other scenarios.

A major

concern in CRNs is relay selection in a distributed, multi-hop environment.
Direct transmissions from a primary transmitter to the intended primary
receiver are ideal but may be severely degraded by multi-path fading and
shadowing due to the unstable, dynamic environment present in wireless
communications [15].
The social phenomena underlying online communities can be directly
related to network formation. These communities have become an integral part
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of everyday life, with over 2 billion Internet users logging in countless hours per
month [47].

Research in building, discovering and analyzing online

communities is increasingly important as the Internet becomes the largest
collection of ideas, personalities, and cultures in history [41].

These

communities represent groups of individuals connected by some social relation,
such as a trusted contact link in a business network, a family relationship, or
a collegiate organization.
This dissertation focuses on a need to understand the social networking
aspect of relay selection in cognitive radio networks. It aims to determine if
humanistic behavior patterns may be applied to forming a successful
communication chain in CRNs.
Prior research has proposed a trust-aware resource allocation scheme in
a cognitive radio network with a system-level trust model in which
trustworthiness is used as social capital to gain system resources [40]. The
focus of [40] is to improve radio spectrum utilization in a centralized CRN. It
describes a reputation model that grants access to resources (i.e. frequency
bands) based on a reputation model.

[43] develops a trust-based data

aggregation scheme to cope with malicious secondary user attack in
cooperative spectrum sensing. Their proposed solutions only partially address
the use of social capital in CRNs. They do not examine the appropriateness of
social networking theory to cognitive radio networks nor address its use in
relay selection.

Our research aims to provide a possible explanation or

correlation to the phenomenon of multi-hop relay selection by testing
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humanistic behavior patterns, which help to influence user intentions in social
networking.
1.3. Research Objectives and Questions
The objective of this research is to help build a better understanding of
social networking and social capital theory in the area of cognitive radio
networks. The focus of this dissertation is on cognitive users’ ability to predict
network formation in cognitive radio networks based on social networking
theories. Four primary goals for this study are presented here:


First, to provide a game-theoretic approach to the multi-hop network
setup problem in cognitive radio networks using a reputation-based
power control model,



Second, to provide empirical evidence about primary users’ ability to
form a network (i.e. the probability of establishing a path) in cognitive
radio networks with a higher utility than direct transmission,



Third, to test social network models’ ability to predict network
formation in the cognitive radio network environment, and



Fourth, to build awareness about the potential uses of social
networking theory in cognitive radio network environments.

The goal is a theoretical exploration for the discussion of cognitive users’
intention to cooperate in network formation and the effectiveness of a social
network model to predict such intentions. The research questions are based
on literature from multi-hop CRN solutions as well as social network theories.
Using a simulated cognitive radio network in the WiMAX module of the network
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simulator ns-3 as a test bed, this investigation attempts to answer the
following research questions:
1. Is the newly proposed reputation-based model comparable to existing
trust schemes?
2. How is the quality-of-service (QoS) for primary users affected by
incorporating the proposed game-theoretic approach to network
formation?
3. Can network constructions derived from social network models
predict actual linkages in a cooperative multi-hop relaying network?
4. What is the current use of social networking theory and social capital
to predict relay selection in cognitive radio networks?
1.4. Guide to the Dissertation
In chapter 2, the definitions of cognitive radios and cognitive radio
networks are presented. Because this dissertation is grounded in cooperative
relay selection, section 2.2 of the literature review presents various cooperation
frameworks for cognitive users.

Section 2.3 discusses social networking

theories and social capital, along with current research relevant to cognitive
radio networks. Section 2.4 describes a social network model and its relevancy
to CRNs.
In chapter 3, the research questions are reiterated and the propositions
are introduced. A theoretical research model is also presented that provides a
game-theoretic approach to the multi-hop network setup problem in CRNs
using a reputation-based model.
7

Chapter 4 focuses on the methodology employed to investigate the
research questions and test the propositions. The simulation environment is
also described in this chapter.

The overall procedures used for testing the

social network models are presented in this chapter.

Chapter 5 provides

analyses of each research question and proposition, and Chapter 6 provides a
conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Background
2.1.1.Cognitive Radios
The definition of a cognitive radio is important here because they
establish the foundation for this research.

A cognitive radio (CR) is an

intelligent radio that can be reconfigured dynamically.

Such a radio

automatically detects the current state of a network, by determining channel
availability, traffic, neighboring users, and other network parameters.

It

adjusts transmission and reception parameters (i.e. transmit power, frequency,
and modulation) in real-time to facilitate reliable communication and optimize
concurrent wireless communications in a given spectrum band.

The FCC

defines a cognitive radio as “a radio that can change its transmitter parameters
based on interaction with the environment in which it operates”. [8]
Cognitive radios adapt if interference is detected by exploiting both
licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands.

They can detect frequencies and

bandwidth where conventional radios cannot; therefore, extracting more
wireless bandwidth. This is accomplished by utilizing Software Defined Radio
(SDR), which will be discussed shortly.

This concept promotes flexible

communication and efficient resource allocation to more sophisticated levels,
by presenting spectrum sharing, coexistence, and interoperability and
cooperation among heterogeneous wireless networks.
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Mitola introduced this concept in [19]. His research states that cognitive
radio “supports automated reasoning about the needs of the user” and
“empowers software radios to conduct expressive negotiations among peers
about the use of radio spectrum across fluents of space, time, and user
context”.

Mitola further explained cognitive radio as an extension to SDR

through a Radio Knowledge Representation Language (RKRL).
Simply, RKRL is an algorithm in a software radio. It provides a standard
language where data exchanges can occur dynamically. Data exchanges may
include, but are not limited to, remote software programming for bug fixes and
upgrades and location-aware services for emergency response and military use.
According to [24], a cognitive radio has two major subsystems, a
cognitive unit that makes decisions based on various stimuli in the
environment and a flexible SDR unit whose operating software is reconfigurable
according to predefined policies and regulations. A separate spectrum sensing
subsystem may be included to detect spectrum holes (i.e. frequency bands not
used by licensed users or having limited interference with them) and to
recognize the presence of radio resources, services, and/or users.

These

subsystems may not be defined as a single piece of equipment, but instead may
be distributed across various components in a cognitive network.
The figure below from [24] more clearly defines the cognitive unit
previously referenced. It is composed of a cognitive engine and a policy engine.
The cognitive engine’s primary purpose is to optimize a performance goal based
on inputs obtained from the radio’s current internal state and surrounding
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environment. The policy engine partners with the cognitive engine to ensure
that the solution it produced remains in compliance with predefined policies
and regulations.

Figure 1: Cognitive Radio Concept Architecture [24]
[21]

describes

the

capabilities

of

cognitive

radios

(cognitive,

reconfigurable, and self-organized) by classifying them based on their
functionality. Below are the features of each.
Cognitive Capability
1. Spectrum sensing:

a CR’s ability to sense radio spectrum and detect

spectrum holes.
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2. Spectrum sharing: refers to a mechanism that would enable sharing of
spectrum under the terms of an agreement between a licensee and a
third party. Negotiation may be permitted on an ad hoc, real-time basis.
3. Location identification: a radio’s ability to determine its location and the
location of neighboring nodes in its environment and then select and/or
adjust corresponding transmission and reception parameters.
4. Network/System discovery: the detection of available one-hop or multihop access networks.
5. Service discovery: the determination of appropriate services needed from
network or system operators.
Reconfigurable Capability
1. Frequency agility: the ability of a CR to change its operating frequency.
2. Dynamic frequency selection:

a mechanism that dynamically detects

signals from other radio frequency systems and avoids collisions with
those systems.
3. Adaptive

modulation/coding:

strategies

that

modify

operating

parameters to provide more efficient solutions for spectrum access.
4. Transmit power control: a feature that enables a device to dynamically
switch

between

several

transmission

power

levels

in

the

data

transmission process.
5. Dynamic system/network access: a radio’s ability to reconfigure itself or
change modes to be compatible with multiple communication systems
following different protocols.
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Self-Organized Capability
1. Spectrum/Radio resource management: techniques to manage spectrum
holes.
2. Mobility

and

connection

management:

features

to

enhance

neighborhood discovery.
3. Trust/Security management:

processes and procedures in place to

address security issues.
2.1.2.The Cognition Cycle
The figure below provides a pictorial representation of the cognition cycle
by Mitola from [23].

The phases of the cognition cycle are orientation,

planning, learning, deciding, acting, and observation.

Sensory stimuli is

obtained from the surrounding environment. It then enters the cycle through
sensory perception and object-level change detection initiates the cognition
cycle.

Information sources for sensory perception may be radio frequency,

speech, text, location, etc.
According to [23], cognitive radios frequently observe their environment,
orient themselves (SEE), create plans (THINK), make independent and
cooperative decisions with other users and networks (TALK), and act on devised
solutions. Thus, cognitive radios are comparable to persons. Actions may be
physical or virtual.

For instance, transmitting a signal, movement, and

associating a user’s action with the current situation are all considered actions.
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Figure 2: The Cognition Cycle as Defined by Mitola [23]
Another interpretation of the cognition cycle can be seen in the next figure.
2.1.3.Cognitive Radio Networks
A cognitive radio network (CRN) is an intelligent, self-organizing network
that changes its transmission and reception parameters to communicate
effectively, while avoiding interference from other licensed users.

It is a

complex adaptive system of heterogeneous entities that display nonlinear
behavior. This wireless architecture utilizes a communication system that does
not operate in a fixed, assigned band. Instead, spectrum sensing is used. This
requires users to continuously scan channels to determine availability. The list
of free channels may vary from node to node and cluster to cluster.
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Figure 3: The Cognition Cycle as Defined by [18]
In CRNs, nodes are distinguished as either primary or secondary users.
Primary users (PUs) are those that have current license agreements with the
FCC which have yet to expire. Secondary users (SUs), also referred to as
cognitive users (CUs), communicate only in those frequencies in which the
primary users are inactive [17]. According to [16], primary users intend to find
a network path with a higher bit rate and a lower delay. On the other hand, a
secondary user’s objective is to gain channel access and, therefore, a higher
throughput for itself, while simultaneously preserving energy consumption as it
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transmits primary traffic. Cooperative communication exploits this mutually
beneficial relationship.
There are various application data types that are transmitted during the
normal operations of a wireless device. These types vary by user and function.
Each of these applications has unique performance characteristics that affect
their normal operations. Not only are the application-specific network handling
requirements varied, but the impact to the overall network is varied. The
network must be able to effortlessly support this diversity. The concept of
associating

application-specific

design

requirements

with

the

network

dynamics of the frequency spectrum lends itself to a quality-of-service (QoS)
methodology [2].
The dynamic nature of cognitive radio networks imposes unique
challenges on network setup. Cooperative transmissions are essential to the
efficient operation of such networks.

Most existing research focuses on the

single-hop relay selection of a primary transmitter-receiver pair. This research
models multi-hop scenarios as a network formation game using a reputationbased infrastructure and transmit power control.

Models of trust are

maintained about neighboring users, forming a reputation mechanism.
Additionally, an interference temperature threshold is enforced to protect
primary users and to provide a method for imposing punishment on users who
violate the network policy.
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2.1.4. Software Defined Radios
As mentioned earlier, CRs extend Software Defined Radio as a means to
enable communication in cognitive radio networks.

SDR technologies can

provide reconfigurable radios with the flexibility, cost efficiency, and power
essential for them to maximize their potential, the benefits of which can help to
increase system efficiencies realized by both service providers and end users.
The SDR Forum, along with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) P1900.1 group, has formed a definition of Software Defined
Radio as “radio in which some or all of the physical layer functions are software
defined”.

Simply, a radio is any kind of device that wirelessly transmits or

receives signals in the radio frequency (RF) part of the electromagnetic
spectrum to facilitate the transfer of information [24].

Radios exist in

computers, mobile phones, garage door openers, televisions, and many other
commonly used devices.
With the tremendous growth in communication methods, traditional
hardware based radio devices are limited in that they can only be modified
through physical revision. As demand increases, SDR offers a more affordable
solution through reconfigurable operating software that allows multi-mode,
multi-band, and/or multi-functional wireless devices the ability to perform
software upgrades.

This is accomplished through modifiable software or

firmware operating on programmable processing technologies.
This research proposes a technique that serves as an add-on component
to the existing primary network and is opportunistically harvested. It does not
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call for major change in the existing primary infrastructure, and therefore is of
great practical interest.
2.2.

Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks
In an exhaustive search of literature for studies related to relay selection

in cognitive radio networks, a variety of articles were uncovered that
investigated the phenomenon of cooperative relay selection in centralized and
distributed networks, single-hop and multi-hop infrastructures, reputationbased approaches, and power control methods. The following section identifies
articles relevant to the research.
Jing et al. in [15] addressed the challenge of efficiently selecting an
appropriate relay node in order to satisfy the quality-of-service needs of the
primary transmitter. Because cognitive radio networks have the potential to
have a large number of secondary users, it may not be feasible to observe all
neighboring nodes. [15] introduced an optimal stopping rule to the selection
process that compares the instantaneous reward and the expected reward of
future observations. The channel quality of the “candidate relay” represents
the instantaneous reward, and the expected reward of future observations is
the reward the primary user can obtain if it continues observing the
subsequent candidate relays. They studied the impacts of their algorithm in
terms of the number of observation steps and the average reward for the PU
pair. They discovered that the number of SU candidate relays influences the
relay selection performance and that the primary user should stop observation
quickly to avoid generating a large cost. Additionally, Jing et al. found that the
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size of the network was directly related to the number of observation steps,
because the PU pair has more relay options. Here, secondary users are also
used to enhance the performance of primary users; however, the focus is
strictly on single hop relaying.
In [5], Huang, Han, Chiang, and Poor describe two auction mechanisms
that determine relay selection and relay power allocation by maximizing total
rate increase. This study seeks to determine when a user should relay, based
on a threshold policy, and how a user should select a relay and allocate its
resources. It provides a distributed algorithm using auction theory, tested on a
single relay network, to address the challenge of efficient resource allocation in
cognitive radio networks. This study does not investigate its benefit to primary
users. Its results are isolated to the performance of secondary users, as does
this research.
The solution provided in [6] explored trust as related to network layer
functions in a cognitive radio network. The network layer functions include
location management, handoff management, and security. The framework to
model trust is computed as a function of the routing path. The overall trust is
determined by multiplying the reputation value at each segment along the
path. In this model, trust is irreversible, and the trust through an intermediate
node cannot be higher than the originating node. [6] does not consider trust
for cooperative relay selection to improve the payoff of primary users.
[12] concentrated on the property-rights model as an approach to grant
spectrum access to secondary users.

In the property-rights model, primary
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users own the spectral resource and have the authority to lease part of it to
cognitive users in exchange for compensation.

The proposed solution is

modeled as a Stackelberg game where secondary nodes have the option to
cooperate or not.

It has a hierarchical structure, where the primary

transmitter’s goal is to enhance its quality-of-service in terms of rate and
probability of outage.

Although [12] employs the cooperation of secondary

users and utilizes a distributed power control method, its primary goal is
toward spectrum sharing and identifying spectrum holes, instead of relay
selection. Also, it does not consider trust as a metric.
A game theoretic model is also provided in [16]. Here the network setup
problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, as in [12]. Although both solutions
are applied to multi-hop scenarios, [16] devised a cooperation framework in
which the primary traffic and the secondary traffic are separated in the
frequency domain and the relays share the leased sub-channel in the time
domain, in an attempt to alleviate interference and reduce delay in the
network.

This research found that a larger transmit power can enlarge the

transmission range, resulting in more cooperation opportunities for both the
primary and secondary users. It also reported that larger transmit power could
reduce user payoffs, if no more relays can be invited to participate in the
cooperative transmissions.

Different from our research, [16] considers the

existence of more than one primary transmitter and primary receiver pair,
competing over a single set of secondary users. Its algorithm allows secondary
users to accept or reject an offer from a primary transmitter based its payoff,
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even if it is currently in cooperation with another primary transmitter. This
research does not consider power control nor trust as metrics for cooperation.
[13] discusses the application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the IEEE
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802.11 standard, specifically
in the distributed coordination function (DCF).

In this game, each player

(node) has two strategies: Transmit or Not Transmit. Users choose a strategy
based on the probability of a function determined by payoffs of a successful
transmission, an idle node, and a failed transmission.

[13] focuses on the

under-utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum and provides an original
technique to identify spectrum holes.
[4] presented a reputation mechanism that applies the Prisoner’s
Dilemma to relay selection. In this mechanism, a centralized authority keeps
records of the cooperative behavior and punishes non-cooperating nodes. Each
node is a player and the strategy is whether to cooperate or not. This paper
emphases the various techniques available to provide incentives to cooperate in
cooperative communication.
[28] focuses on secondary communication where transmitters and
receivers are located in different areas of primary users with varying spectrum
diversity.

It proposes a cooperative relay scheme to “improve spectrum

utilization and increase the SINR of secondary communication”.

This study

focuses on the Interference Power Constraint as a general scheme of power
control. It exploits a single relay node to improve the received SINR, based on
the relay’s location between the transmitter and receiver nodes. The emphasis
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here is determining whether or not to employ the use of a relay node strictly for
improved utility for secondary users, as opposed to primary users.
A noncooperative power control game is presented in [54].

Similar to

[28], Jia and Zhang present a framework for spectrum sharing in [54] that
concentrates on an interference temperature limit, in only one effective
communication area. This research uses an exclusive user model for spectrum
sharing.

Here, a primary user has “exclusive and transferable rights to the

user of a specified spectrum within a defined geographic area, with flexible
spectrum use rights that are governed primarily by technical rules to protect
spectrum against interference” [54]. In this model, users’ transmissions are
backed off if they violate the interference temperature limit. This backing off
technique affects their quality-of-service and overall payoff function. [54] only
focuses on secondary communication.

Its game does not involve secondary

users assisting with primary user communication.

Additionally, this use of

power control is geared toward spectrum sharing instead of relay selection. In
contrast to [54], the original technique presented in this research uses power
control to evaluate trustworthiness of neighboring nodes and provides a
forgiveness mechanism that allows users to re-enter game play after violation
of any constraints.
2.3.

Social Networking Theories and Social Capital
The review of literature in the previous section discussed specific

protocols for relay selection, transmit power control, and trust in a cognitive
radio network.

This section focuses on defining social network theory and
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social capital and explaining how it is applicable to relay selection in cognitive
radio networks.
2.3.1.Social Network Theory
Social network theory (SNT) explains how information and connections
develop in the framework of active social groups in self organizational
communities.

Social interaction has been studied in sociology, psychology,

communication, and economics, with recent studies in computer networks.
Hammond and Glenn relate social network theory to complexity theory in [52]
because “it seeks to explain nonlinear phenomena by focusing on the flow of
information through relationships”. Note the similarity of this definition to that
of cognitive radio networks presented in Section 2.1.3.
Let’s use a Chinese marketplace to relate SNT to cognitive radio
networks. In this real social network, traders, farmers, and craftsmen sell their
products and services in a highly interactive environment that constantly
changes. People broadcast their desire to conduct business and willingness to
negotiate by shouting in the air.
better deal.
information.

Often times, regular customers receive a

Friends gossip, spreading important economic and political
Trading is preferred, although money may be exchanged.

The

marketplace is a place of exchange, where trust is gained and lost and where
trade skills and established relationships are essential to survival.
In CRNs, the traders, farmers, and craftsmen may be related to the
primary users and secondary users. Transmission rate, channel availability,
delay, and energy conservation are resources that may be considered products
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and services, as in the marketplace.

Users broadcast their desire to route

information to their neighbors, and network state information is exchanged
among users. A history of interactions can provide information pertinent to the
reputation of neighboring users.

Additionally, virtual currency may be

exchanged in cognitive radio networks as an incentive to cooperate.
Three important overlapping conceptualizations may be noted between
social network theory and cognitive radio networks. They include information
and sustainability, change and emergence, and order and chaos.

First,

information exchange is key to CRNs as a social system. Information allows
the individual to adapt to changes in the environment sensed by other parts of
the network and foster sustainability [52]. Competition and collaboration in
the network creates various trust levels among users.
In SNT, there are strong ties and weak ties. Strong ties consist of links
to individuals or groups with whom you have regular and direct contact. For
humans, individuals have strong ties with parents and siblings. Analogously,
cognitive users have strong ties with one-hop neighbors.

Weak ties are the

nodes in the network that reach beyond immediate friends and family. That is,
two-hop and three-hop neighbors.

Both category of ties are critical to

communication and sustainability.
Secondly, the ability to adapt to change in the emergence of unique
situations is inherent, as cognitive users must adjust reception parameters
based

on

outside

stimuli.

They

must
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also

alternate

their

role

in

communication, serving as both senders and receivers of information.

The

roles of the primary transmitter and primary receiver pair remain consistent.
Order can be defined as “an emergent rhythm” [52].

This may be

displayed in CRNs as nodes replicate their relay selections in subsequent
communications based on an established history of trust, that is, a predictable
set of strong and weak ties. Chaos may be easily related to a network failure,
caused by either an individual or cluster failure.
2.3.2.Social Capital
Social capital is defined as the “value of the relationships we create and
maintain within our social networks to gain access to and mobilize needed
resources” by Smith in [41]. Social capital is dependent on initial positions in
the social hierarchies, as well as, on the range of social ties, according to Lin in
[36].

Research has shown that social capital is higher when members of a

community are linked and cooperating with each other.
In terms of sociology, it may be categorized as personal resources or
social resources. Lin’s differentiation of the two are as follows:
Personal resources belong to an individual who can use and dispose
them with freedom and without much concern for compensation. Social
resources are resources accessible through one’s direct and indirect ties.
The access to and use of these resources are temporary and borrowed.
For example, a friend’s occupational or authority position, or such
positions of this friend’s friends, may be ego’s [an individual’s] social
resource. The friend may use his/her position or network to help ego to
find a job. These resources are borrowed and useful to achieve ego’s
certain goal, but they remain the property of the friend or his/her
friends. [36]
Both strong and weak ties play important roles in social capital as they
foster reciprocity, coordination, communication, and collaboration. Behavior of
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such ties in cognitive radio networks affords achievement of the ultimate goal,
packet-forwarding from the primary transmitter to the primary receiver.
Intuitively, the primary transmitter and receiver pair benefit from increased bit
rate and decreased delay by utilizing the shared affiliations or activities of
secondary users.
Studies of the actual dynamic behavior of social entities has been applied
to examining the compensation of CEOs and investigating how interpersonal
channels affect individuals’ ability to secure more satisfactory jobs.

Research

has led to the discovery of patterns in behavior that will be exploited here in
the relay selection process of cognitive radio networks.
Qin et al. view trustworthiness as social capital in cognitive radio
networks. It is used by the community of nodes to encourage good behavior
and facilitate dynamic spectrum access.

This research uses a similar

approach, as it views trustworthiness as social capital in CRNs to encourage
positive interactions and facilitate relay selection.
This leads to a need to define trust as it relates to both social network
analysis and cognitive radio networks. In both areas, trust is a measure of
uncertainty.

In social network analysis, behavior is judged through

interactions among linked entities and trust measurements are made as a
function of these interactions [39]. Similarly, in cognitive radio networks, it is
a measure of the confidence of a network node on the ability of other nodes to
transmit data, while preserving the veracity of the data [39].
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2.3.3.Applications of Social Network Theory in CRNs
As previously mentioned, Qin et al. in [40] proposed a trust-aware
resource allocation scheme in a cognitive radio network with a system-level
trust model in which trustworthiness is used as social capital to gain system
resources. Its focus is to improve radio spectrum utilization in a centralized
CRN.

The proposed scheme has two parts which include trust-aware

collaborative sensing and resource allocation.

In trust-aware collaborative

sensing, a secondary user performs a sensing operation to determine the
activity state of a primary user and reports its observation to a base station.
Here, a trustworthiness score is calculated for each SU.

The next step,

resource allocation, is to maximize the total bit rate for all chosen SUs subject
to “total transmit power, trustworthiness, and PU interference constraints”.
Wang and Chen develop a trust-based data aggregation scheme to cope
with malicious secondary user attacks in cooperative spectrum sensing in [43].
The objectives of the aggregation scheme are: too provide no incentive for
malicious SUs to report fake sensing capabilities; to minimize the cost endured
by the “Data Fusion Center”; and to maximize the success decision rate for the
data fusion outcome matching the ground truth channel availability. In this
research, the Data Fusion Center is a centralized authority that has an
overarching view of PU channel occupancy for the network. A game-theoretic
design is employed as an incentive for secondary users to accurately and
honestly relay sensing capabilities and sensing results.
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[39] develops a relationship between the trust concepts in the social
network theory and wireless ad hoc networks. It examines trust in the context
of routing and reliable forwarding of data in these networks.

It proposes a

scheme that uses balance theory to predict bidirectional ties. Modeled in terms
of signed graphs, the nodes of the graph represent users and the
positive/negative edges represent their friendly/hostile relationships.

The

potential source of tensions are formed from three agents in a clique that
create a cycle.

Local density measurements are used to set thresholds for

direct trust for nodes.

In other words, there is a correlation between the

number of direct ties a node has and the number of mutual local neighbors.
This trust scheme incorporates indirect observations to calculate direct trust
values and utilizes dynamic thresholds.
The ergodicity of the dynamics of cognitive radio networks, having a grid
topology and random deployment, by using the model of interacting particles in
nonequilibrium statistical mechanics is studied by Li et al. in [35].

The

ergodicity of the social behavior dynamics means “whether the dynamics will
converge to a single equilibrium or may have multiple equilibria” [35]. This is a
study of the social behavior propagation in cognitive radio networks,
particularly the propagation of channel preference in the recommendation
system using a social networks framework. Spin systems are used to model
cognitive radio networks. These types of systems consist of a finite number of
elements, each represented by either state 0 or state 1.

The overall system

state is the collection of the individual states in continuous time, and a
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nonnegative function can be given that displays the rate at which any given
element flips its current state.
In [29], Gunasekaran and Nagarajan use social network theory to
propose a mobility model to detect the movement of the nodes within a mobile
ad hoc network.

They introduce a Unified Relationship Matrix (URM) to

represent relationships from multiple and heterogeneous groups. Input to this
mobility model is a social network matrix, which has the connections of
individuals carrying the mobile devices.

Relationships may be intra-type

(belonging to the same group) or inter-type (belonging to different groups).
2.4. Social Network Model
An exhaustive search of literature for studies related to predicting relay
selection in cognitive radio networks using social network theory has shown a
scarcity of research in this area. As seen in the previous section, research has
been conducted on using SNT in CRNs related to discovering dynamic
spectrum access, behavior propagation, bidirectional ties, and mobility. To my
best knowledge, this research is the first to study the use of social network
models to predict relay selection in cognitive radio networks.
Social network models study the actual dynamics of social network
formation and evolution, leading to the discovery of relationships and behavior
patterns [41].

These models were originally developed to test for factors

influencing social relationships among individuals.

[44] uses social network

models in social psychological experiments to analyze the mean proportion of
time spent speaking by doctors to different types of patients. They have also
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been applied to social status attainment in [36], where studies were conducted
to determine the relationship of social capital to socioeconomic attainment.
In contrast, Fletcher et al. applied social network models to infer
connectivity across landscapes in areas relevant to ecology and conservation
biology in [27].

This technique was used because the statistical models of

social networks have the ability to reveal complex, emergent patterns with
limited data to predict linkages. In ecology and conservation, network analysis
is increasingly being used to assess population connectivity across landscapes.
[27] considers two types of social network models, a sender-receiver
model [31] and a latent space model [32] to predict landscape connectivity of
“within-field movements of cactus-feeding insect (Chelindea vittiger) on patchy
Opuntia cactus and breeding-season movements of the endangered Everglades
snail kite (Rostrhamus sociabilis plumbeus) across wetlands in peninsular
Florida”. These models require empirical data on movement. The study found
that the sender-receiver models provided the highest predictive accuracy in
both networks and was the only model that could account for the observed
directionality in movement, although it predicted a higher level of exchange in
movement than what was actually observed. The next section discusses the
latent space model used by Fletcher et al. in [27] and its relevance to relay
prediction in cognitive radio networks.
2.4.1.Latent Space Model
Social network data, just as cognitive radio network data, typically
consists of a set of entities, often called users, along with the links that connect
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them.

Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock related these links as ordered pairs of

actors in [32]. This model is described by a set of n actors and a relational tie
yi,j, measured on each ordered pair of actors i, j = 1, …, n. In the simplest
cases, yi,j is a “dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of
some relation of interest, such as friendship, collaboration, transmission of
information or disease, and so forth” [32].
The data is modeled as an n x n sociomatrix Y, with entries yi,j denoting
the value of the relation from actor i to actor j. In the binary case, yi,j = 1
indicates the presence of an edge (direct tie) in a graph, and yi,j = 0 indicates
the absence of a direct tie. Cognitive radio networks may also be represented
in this fashion, where yi,j = 1 represents one-hop neighbors (direct ties).
Hoff et al. take a conditional, independent approach to modeling by
assuming that the presence or absence of an edge between two individuals is
independent of all other edges in the system.

They provide a probability

measure over unobserved characteristics of a social network in which the
presence of a tie between two individuals is dependent on the presence of other
ties. In other words, the observation of i → j and j → k suggests that i and k are
not too far apart in social space.

[32] gives a logistic regression model

(ni,j = log odds(yi,j = 1 | zi, zj, xi,j, α, β) ) in which the probability of a tie depends
on the Euclidean distance between zi and zj.
The results from [32] showed that this model may be used to improve the
statistical uncertainty in the social space to be quantified, to generalize
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multiple relationships with varying strengths, to leverage limited data, and to
apply transitive characteristics to models lacking such structure.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
3.1. Introduction
This chapter reiterates the research questions and puts forth the
propositions for this study.

The research questions were generated from

literature related to cognitive radio networks and social networking theory. As
seen in the Emergency Management Survey [48], 40 percent of emergency
respondents use ham radio and fixed radio to communicate during emergency
operations.

With additional applications in military operations and other

sentient spaces, there is a need for reliable relay selection in cognitive radio
networks. Because these situations are dynamic, emergent, and often chaotic,
they require reciprocity, coordination, communication, and collaboration
among users. This lends social network models as a tool to perform network
analysis where limited data is available yet a quick response is demanded.
3.2. Research Questions
The primary research questions of this study are listed below.

It is

important to note that the focus of this study is not purely on the use of social
network theory in cognitive radio networks, but also on the multi-hop network
setup problem. As seen in [29], [35], [39], [40], and [43], research has been
conducted on using SNT in CRNs related to discovering dynamic spectrum
access, behavior propagation, bidirectional ties, and mobility. Therefore, the
shift in use is to the effectiveness of a social network model to predict relay
selection in the network setup problem experienced by CRNs.
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Chapter 4

discusses the methodologies employed to assess the effectiveness of the newly
proposed reputation-based, power control model, as well as, to evaluate the
effectiveness of social network models in predicting relay selection.
1. Is the newly proposed reputation-based model comparable to existing
trust schemes?
2. How is the quality-of-service (QoS) for primary users affected by
incorporating

the

proposed

game-theoretic

approach

to

network

formation?
3. Can network constructions derived from social network models predict
actual linkages in a cooperative multi-hop relaying network?
4. What is the current use of social networking theory and social capital to
predict relay selection in cognitive radio networks?
3.3. Research Propositions
The above mentioned research questions can be broken down into four
areas of discovery:
Proposition 1:

The new distributed, game-theoretic approach to
relay selection in CRNs, using trustworthiness as
social capital, is comparable to existing trust
schemes.

Proposition 2:

The QoS enjoyed by primary users is improved by
using secondary users to transmit primary data.

Proposition 3:

The latent space model [32] may be applied in
CRNs to predict multi-hop relay selection.
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Proposition 4:

This research presents the first solution to using
social networking theories in relay selection for
cognitive radio networks.

The newly proposed algorithm for relay selection in cognitive radio
networks is of great interest in this study.

The average trustworthiness of

users that have implemented the new trust scheme should be comparable to
existing schemes. (Proposition 1)
The cooperation framework presented by the RBPCG considers relay
selection in which the multi-hop relay path is computed by performing the
players’ strategies in the form of link operations. It must be determined if a
Nash Equilibrium exists for the network formation game that maximizes the
payoff received by primary users that are able to get into cooperation with
relays. (Proposition 2)
Due to the overlapping conceptualizations between cognitive radio
networks and social network theory, this research contends that a social
network model may be applied to the relay selection problem, with
modifications directly related to inherent characteristics of CRNs.
Fletcher et al. reported that the sender-receiver models presented in [31]
provided the highest predictive accuracy in both of its empirical, markrecapture datasets and was the only model that could account for the observed
directionality in movement, although it predicted a higher level of exchange in
movement than what was actually observed. It is reasonable to hypothesize
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that these techniques will have a similar effect on relay selection in cognitive
radio networks. (Proposition 3)
One of the main goals of this research is to determine the use of social
networking theories and social capital for relay selection in cognitive radio
networks. A comprehensive review of literature may support that this research
is uncharted territory in this field of study. (Proposition 4)
3.4. Theoretical Research Model
This section details the algorithm that provides the framework to test the
above propositions.

It begins with a brief overview of game theory and

cooperation incentives.
3.4.1.Game Theory Overview
Game theory is the study that analyzes the dynamic strategies of rational
individuals who are engaged in competitive interactions.

It provides a

mechanism to predict future moves of an opponent who may have conflicting
interests. Game theory has been applied to contexts in war, economics, and
networks.
As mentioned earlier, cognitive users must be aware of the changes in
their environment and be capable of adapting their transmission parameters
accordingly. These users have the ability to observe, learn and act to optimize
their total performance, unlike conventional spectrum sharing where it is
generally assumed that all users cooperate in a static environment [13]. Within
this context, game theory can be appropriately applied to the network setup
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problem because cognitive users are autonomous, opportunistic agents seeking
to maximize benefits.
The main components of any game are the set of players, the set of
strategies, and the utility function.

The set of players are the finite set of

decision makers. Each player has a set of strategies. These are the actions
that they may choose during game play. The series of actions performed by
each player will determine the outcome of the overall game.

The utility

function associates a numerical payoff for every outcome product of an action
taken by a player.
Generally, games may be divided into noncooperative games and
cooperative games.

In cooperative games, players compete and cooperate to

form coalitions in unstructured interactions to create and obtain specific
payoffs. Cooperative games are out of the scope of this paper. On the other
hand, noncooperative games are modeled under the basis that all players make
choices or play strategies considering only their own selfish interests – their
final objective is to maximize their own total utility [16]. Noncooperative games
have various categories that pertain to players’ strategies and the availability of
information.
1. Static game:

players make decisions simultaneously, or in

isolation, with no information about other players’ past or present
decisions.
2. Dynamic game: occurs when there is a strict order of turns that
the players must obey.
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3. Complete information game:

all players are conscious of the

number of players, the strategies, and the utility function of the
rest.
4. Incomplete information game: one or more of the components (the
number of players, the strategies, and the utility function) of the
game must be estimated or assumed.
3.4.2.Cooperation Incentives
Cooperative

communication

has

great

potential

communication, especially when paired with game theory.

in

wireless

A main obstacle

blocking the widespread use of it is the lack of incentives for users to
participate

in

cooperative
to

communication.

mechanisms

designed

provide

such

mechanism,

resource-exchange-based

There
incentives:

mechanism,

are

three

primary

reputation-based
and

pricing-based

mechanism.
In a reputation-based mechanism, a centralized authority maintains
history of the cooperative behavior and punishes noncooperative nodes. Here,
each node is considered to be a player, and its strategy is whether to cooperate
with another node.

In general, all players are assumed to play the best

strategy that yields the best utility.

Cooperative nodes may be awarded

permission to transmit at a higher power, while noncooperative nodes will be
punished and not afforded this opportunity.
The source node exploits relays for cooperative communication in the
resource-exchange-based mechanism. As an award, the source node provides
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its own resource to help the relay nodes achieve certain objectives [4].

For

example, in cognitive radio networks, primary users may use secondary users
as relays. If the secondary users choose to cooperate, they will obtain access to
the wireless channel for their own transmissions in return.
In the pricing-based mechanism, virtual currency or tokens are assumed
in the network. Relay nodes sell their resources (e.g. bandwidth, power, time)
for a certain price.

According to [4], source nodes make payments to relay

nodes for using their resources. Often times, a game using this mechanism
will form either a buyer’s or seller’s market.
3.4.3.Introduction to the Reputation-Based Power Control Game
This work will focus on the study of relay selection in cognitive radio
networks using a reputation-based power control game (RBPCG). This model
will be a dynamic, incomplete information game. There is a strict order of play,
and all players are aware of the number of players and the utility function of
the players. Each player does not share their strategies, although some path
information is shared.
It considers the case where secondary users coexist with primary users
to conduct data transmissions.

Primary users are those that have current

license agreements with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which
have yet to expire.

Secondary (cognitive) users communicate only in those

frequencies in which primary users are inactive, and operate based on
agreements/etiquettes imposed by primary users of the spectrum.
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An interference temperature is established to protect the primary users.
The power control problem is one of the most critical issues in such a model. It
is formulated in cooperative cognitive radio networks to maximize energy
efficiency of secondary users and guarantee the quality-of-service (QoS) of both
primary and secondary users. The secondary users, equipped as transmitter
and receiver pairs, sharing a licensed frequency have to regulate their
transmission power so that the interference temperature limit at a specified
measurement point is not violated. The QoS of elastic traffic is directly related
to signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the receivers, which is a
result of the transmission power of secondary users. Secondary users have
elastic-data applications in which throughput of each user is determined by the
SINR at its receiver [54].
Measurement points are nodes that monitor the real-time interference
temperature of a given frequency band at their locations. There is interaction
among the measurement points, primary users, and secondary users.

We

assume that a measurement point maintains a history of secondary users who
violate the maximum received power at its location, as well as, monitors the
interference temperature. As long as the interference temperature threshold
(ITT) is not violated, the measurement point will not interfere in the secondary
users’ operation. As in [54], if the limit is exceeded, the measurement point
will notify the secondary users generating the highest interference.

These

secondary users will back off their data transmissions, upon receiving such a
notification.

When there are several secondary users generating the same
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highest interference, the user with the lowest trust will be used to break the tie.
(Trust will be discussed in future sections.) If the ITT is still violated, the next
highest user will be notified to back off. This process will continue until the
interference temperature threshold is no longer violated.
Additionally, this model defines interaction between the primary users
and the secondary users. Interaction occurs during relay selection and when a
defect occurs.

A defect occurs when the measurement point notifies the

secondary user who is generating the highest received power that the
interference limit has been violated, when a secondary user chooses to defect
for selfish reasons (i.e. inefficient power supply), or when a secondary user fails
to respond to a relay request.

A primary user may notified of a defect by

secondary users and the measurement point.
Considering the selfishness of secondary users, this project will be
modeled as a noncooperative game where all players make choices or play
strategies considering only their own selfish interests – their final objective is to
maximize their total utility. Under the assumption that each user is rational, it
must be determined if a unique Nash equilibrium can be identified in this
game.
This model follows an exclusive use model in which “a licensee (primary
user) has exclusive and transferable rights to the user of a specified spectrum
within a defined geographic area, with flexible spectrum use rights that are
governed primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum against interference”
[54]. The defined geographic area is the effective communication area (ECA).
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The exclusive use model introduces a metric called interference temperature to
quantify and manage the interference in the ECA and provide protection to
primary users. Based on such a metric, a primary user sets up an interference
temperature threshold under which secondary users can coexist with primary
users. The ITT must not be violated at the primary user’s receiver. According
to the FCC, interference temperature threshold ITT is specified in Kelvin and is
defined as
ITT(m, W) =

𝑃𝐼 (𝑚,𝑊)
𝑘𝑊

(1)

where PI is the average interference power in Watts centered at m, covering
bandwidth W measured in Hertz, and the Boltzmann’s constant k is 1.38x10-23
Joules per Kelvin degree.

The FCC would establish an interference

temperature threshold (ITT) for a given geographic area. This is the highest
tolerable interference for a given bandwidth in a particular location.
unlicensed

user

utilizing

this

bandwidth

must

guarantee

that

Any
their

transmissions, added to the existing interference, must not surpass the
interference temperature threshold at a licensed receiver.
3.4.4.System Model
The system model we study is an IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless
Access System (WiMAX). The primary wireless network is OFDMA-based. We
focus on relay selection in multi-hop communication between primary
transmitter-receiver pairs that maximizes energy efficiency of secondary users
and guarantees the quality-of-service (QoS) of both primary and secondary
users.

The system model is provided in Figure 4.
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There is one primary

transmitter (PT), primary receiver (PR) pair. The PT owns the license for PU
Band 1, and the PR owns the license for PU Band 2.

The effective

communication areas (ECA) are denoted by a and b, for PU Band 1 and PU
Band 2 respectively. The other nodes are secondary users. They are either
located in communication area a or b.
There are two measurement points, xa and xb.

These measurement

points monitor the interference temperature thresholds of the effective
communication areas and maintain a history of user violations. xa and xb are
located on the boundary of a and b, respectively, with the shortest distance to
a or b.

PT

xb

xa

PU Band 1

PU Band 2

PR

b

a

Figure 4: RBPCG System Model
3.4.5.Utility Functions
We make the following assumptions with respect to the communication
network. We assume at an ECA a primary user offers a portion of its frequency
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spectrum to be shared among a set of secondary users. Each secondary user
is a transmitter-receiver pair.

All secondary users use decode-and-forward

multi-hopping to relay primary data.
The interference temperature threshold is interpreted as a threshold of
the total receiver power at a specified measurement point. This is denoted by
Ta and Tb, for each licensee’s designated geographic area. Following [54] and
[57], we denote the transmit power for user i by pi and pi ∈ Pi = [𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 ].
𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

(2)

We let Pi = (0, +∞), which is interpreted as the achievable power of
secondary users can generate interference much higher than the power
threshold at the measurement point [54]. N is the total number of secondary
users.
The link gain from user i’s transmitter to user j’s receiver is gij and the
link gain from i’s transmitter to a measurement point is gim, where m is either
xa or xb. Then the ITT for the designated geographic areas are denoted by
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑥𝑎 ≤ 𝑇𝑎

(3)

∑𝑁
𝑖=𝑛+1 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑥𝑏 ≤ 𝑇𝑏 (4)
where n is the number of secondary users interfering with the primary
transmitter and N-n denotes the number of secondary users interfering with
the primary receiver. Similar functions are used in [28] and [54].
First, we consider

the case when

no relays are

employed for

communication. For direct communications, the SINR, denoted by 𝛾(𝑃𝑇), is
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p PT g PT , PR

2

(5)

(5) is used in [5], [28], [54], and [57], with some variations.
As stated earlier, secondary users produce elastic traffic in which
throughput of each user is determined by the SINR at its receiver. When user i
is not backed off by the measurement point, the quality of service (QoS) enjoyed
by user i in a specified effective communication area is characterized by a
function ui(𝛾i), where 𝛾i is the SINR at user i’s receiver,

𝛾𝑖 (𝒑) =

𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑣
∑𝑗=𝑢,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑗𝑚 + 𝜎2

, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁

(6)

where 𝜎 2 is the background noise at secondary receiver j, {u, … , v} is the set of
secondary users that interfere with each other in a given ECA, and p is the
transmit power vector of a given ECA.
The efficiency function ui defined for this project
𝑢𝑖 (𝛾𝑖 ) = ln(𝛾𝑖 )

(7)

presents the throughput of communication systems in the high SINR regime.
This efficiency function is also used in [54] and [57].
If user i is backed off, then its utility is 0. B denotes the set of secondary
users that have backed off their transmissions. B includes the users with the
largest interference at a measurement point. B is set to null after a designated
number of data transmissions, in order to allow those users to re-enter play.
p* is the transmit power vector after the backing off process. Ui denotes user i’s
utility.
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𝑢𝑖 (𝒑), 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
𝑢𝑖 (𝒑∗ ), 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
Ui (p) =
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵
{ 0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵

(8)

where T is the interference temperature threshold for a certain effective
communication area, denoted by Ta or Tb.
follows that of [54].

The above utility function Ui (p)

However, [54] only considers a single effective

communication area.
Also, the existing utility function does not embody the effect of trust in
relay selection.

However, we can introduce pricing as an effective tool to

qualify such effects. An efficient pricing mechanism will encourage secondary
users to share resources in order to maximize their utility.

The pricing

function is denoted by τ.
A pricing function is used for incorporating direct trust and reputation
into a probabilistic formulation.

This mechanism provides not only a trust

measure about a neighbor, but also a level of confidence (C) that must be
maintained in order to forward network traffic.

The approach incorporates

both positive (α) and negative (β) vectors to calculate the belief against the
required level of confidence.
Each user maintains a set of α and β vectors that represent the histories
of interactions with other users. If a user is sent a request to forward network
traffic and they do not respond, this is considered a β observation. A nonresponse may indicate a node failure and the primary transmitter is notified. A
response may be either positive or negative. All users are initially trusted.
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Each time a user receives a request from another user, it will evaluate
the trust model to determine whether to participate. The trust model provides
the mean probability that a user can be trusted, based on its own observations
(direct trust) and those from all one-hop neighbors shared by both users
(reputation). The user will not be trusted if the trust value is less than the
confidence level. A user is considered to be on punishment once its confidence
level drops below the minimum.

In repeated play, a succession of positive

observations can move an untrusted neighbor back to being trusted again.
Initially, α = 1 and β = 0.

H is the set of one-hop neighbors for a

specified user. A user i’s measure of trust (direct trust) for any given one-hop
neighbor is computed by a function ti(h). The value of ti(h) is expected to be
𝑡𝑖 (ℎ) =

𝛼+1
(𝛼+𝛽)+1

(9)

where h ∈ H, α is the number of successful interactions at a given time, and β
is the number of unsuccessful interactions at a given time between i and h,
with respect to i.
The trust value of a requester (reputation), τ, is expected to be:
𝜏𝐿 =

∑𝑠𝑦=1 𝑡𝑦 (𝐿)+ 𝑡𝑖 (𝐿)
𝑠+1

, ∀𝑦 ∈ 𝑆

(10)

where S is the set of shared neighbors between user i, that has received a
request, and the requester, L. The number of shared neighbors is denoted by
s. The requesting node uses the same scheme to determine the trust of its
one-hop neighbors. Both the primary transmitters and primary receivers are
always trusted.
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In this game, each user must decide between two strategies: cooperate
or defect. The primary transmitters and primary receivers always cooperate. It
is assumed that the player initiating a move has agreed to cooperate and will
continue play.
Taking the pricing function into consideration, the utility function Ui is
𝑢𝑖 (𝒑), 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑖 ≥ 𝐶 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
𝑢𝑖 (𝒑∗ ), 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑖 ≥ 𝐶 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
Ui (p) =
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝜏𝑖 < 𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵)
{ 0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑣𝑖=𝑢 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝜏𝑖 < 𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵)

(11)

3.4.6.Relay Selection Game Formulation
This model produces empirical evidence that can be used to predict if a
PT-PR pair will be able to get into cooperation with a set of relays (i.e. the
probability of establishing a path) that improve its SINR. Initially, the primary
transmitter will perform direct transmission to the primary receiver in order to
establish the baseline SINR. Once the baseline SINR has been determined, the
PT-PR pair will resend the signal by employing the help of secondary users.
In this relay selection game, the players consist of the transmitters and
the receivers of the primary communication pairs and the secondary users,
which are denoted as primary players and secondary players, respectively. The
players are connected according to some network relationship summarized by
an undirected graph G(V, E), with V being the players and E being the set of
links connecting two interacting players in the game.
Definition 1: (Path) A path, D, of the PT-PR pair is defined as a subset of E
consisting of a sequence of players, i.e. D = {(vk, vk+1) ∈ E | k = 1, 2, …, k-1, v1 =
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PT, vk = PR}, and (vk, vk+1) is a directed link from vk to vk+1 and k is the number
of players on the path.
In this game, the action of each player is reflected by the operation on
links. The action space contains two operations: add a link or back-off a link.
The primary players, specifically the PT, initiate the cooperation. Secondary
users may accept or reject a request for cooperation. The PR does not play any
strategies. The measurement point monitors communication links.
Definition 2: (Action Space) The action space of PT is defined as S = {s(i) =
[+(vk, SUi), -(vk, SUi)] | SUi ∈ (N ∩ V) \ VD, vk ∈ VD}.
In other words, a strategy is a sequence of actions that form
communication links by adding a link, +(vk, SUi), or backing off a link, -(vk,
SUi). D+s(i) denotes the modified path after an action is taken.
Definition 3: (Beneficial Action) An action s(i) ∈ S is a beneficial action for PT
if and only if ui(𝛾i) > uPT(𝛾PT) and 𝜏i ≥ C.
Definition 4: (Action Preference List) An action preference list 𝑆̅ is the set of
all its beneficial actions sorted in increasing order of distance from the PT.
The action preference list is limited to one-hop neighbors. According to
the simple path loss model in [28], link gain is a strictly decreasing function of
the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, so the following
inequations are satisfied in our system model of Figure 4.
𝑔𝑃𝑇,1 > 𝑔𝑃𝑇,𝑃𝑅 , 𝑔𝑃𝑇,3 > 𝑔𝑃𝑇,𝑃𝑅

(12)

Definition 5: (Best Action) An action s(i*) ∈ S is the best action of PT if and
only if s(i*) is in the first place of the action preference list 𝑆̅.
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3.4.7.Algorithm
We assume that each player wants to maximize their own utility. Players
want to use large transmission power to obtain high SINR at the receiver.
Initially, D = ∅. During the distributed relay selection process, the PT exploits
the measurement point to determine the next-hop relay. The PT selects the
next-hop relay according to the following steps:
1. QoS Arbitration
PT announces its cooperation information to its one-hop neighbors,
identified by the measurement point. Then each neighbor determines its
QoS (ui(𝛾i)) obtained from PT and feedbacks the cooperation information,
including its transmit power from Pi.
2. Handover Request
After receiving the replies from all one-hop neighbors, PT computes the
payoff (Ui (p)) for the add action in S and makes the corresponding action
preference list 𝑆̅. If 𝑆̅ = ∅, PT does not have any incentive to cooperate.
Otherwise, it sends an offer to SUi*, which corresponds to the best action
s(i*), and then removes s(i*) from 𝑆̅. With this removal, the best action of
PT changes after each handover request and an SU receives the offer
from PT at most once during each round.
3. Cooperation Agreement
PT gets into cooperation with SUi* if its offer is accepted, and it is out of
cooperation if it is rejected by SUi*. At this point, the measurement point
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determines the allowable QoS of each secondary player in the given ECA,
using an inverse linear distribution that affords s(i*) the greatest gain.
Algorithm 1 Reputation-Based Power Control Game
Initialization: the network graph G(V, E), D = ∅, k = 0
repeat
k=k+1
PT announces cooperation information to H
for all SUi : H
Compute ui(𝛾i)
Send PT cooperation information
PT computes Ui(p) for all H
if 𝑆̅ ≠ ∅
Remove s(i*) associated with SUi* from 𝑆̅
SUi* accepts PT
Measurement point broadcasts allowable QoS
else
PT sends direct transmission to PR
until vk = PR

3.4.8.Game Model
We consider a game in strategic form. Let RBPCG = [K, {Pi}, {Ui}] denote
the noncooperative reputation-based, power control game. Here K are the set
of players on a path from PT to PR. Each player picks a transmit power from
the strategy space Pi which is continuous and receives a payoff Ui (p).
Theorem: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) for the RBPCG, a path
profile (strategy profile), which is
d* = (𝑑1∗ , 𝑑2∗ , … , 𝑑𝑘∗ ) (13)
Proof: In the case of cooperative communication, the received SINR from PT to
PR will be the smallest of the multi-hop relaying.
defined to describe this.
𝛾𝑒 = min(𝛾𝑣2 , … , 𝛾𝑣𝑘 ) (14)
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An effective SINR (𝛾e) is

By definition, the best action s(i*) has a utility that is greater than that of
a direct transmission. If 𝛾𝑣𝑖 > 𝛾𝑃𝑇 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 and ui(𝛾i) > 𝑢𝑃𝑇 (𝛾𝑃𝑇 ) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐾, then 𝛾𝑒 >
𝛾𝑃𝑇 and ue(𝛾e) > 𝑢𝑃𝑇 (𝛾𝑃𝑇 ). Therefore, a path profile d* is a NE if it is a fixed point
of the best responses, i.e.
∗
∗
𝑢𝑖 (𝑑𝑖∗ , 𝑑−𝑖
) ≥ 𝑢𝑖 (𝑑𝑖′ , 𝑑−𝑖
) (15)
∗
for any 𝑑−𝑖
and any user i.

∗
∗
∗
, 𝑑𝑖+1
, … , 𝑑𝐾∗ ).
Here, 𝑑−𝑖
= (𝑑1∗ , … , 𝑑𝑖−1

In a Nash

equilibrium, none of the players can improve its utility function by unilaterally
changing its next-hop relay. Therefore, a NE is a stable outcome of the game.
Lemma 1:

The NE for the RBPCG maximizes the payoff Ui (p) when each

player is afforded a QoS allocation at the measurement point by using an
inverse linear distribution of the received interference temperature threshold,
i.e.
pigim =

𝑇
𝑛𝐴−𝑬

(A – ei) (16)

Proof: The reason this maximizes the utility function for a given path profile is
explained as follows.
According to Definition 4, players in the action preference list are ranked
according to the simple path loss model. Let ei for i = 1, 2, …, n be the distance
of each player in a given effective communication area. The set of nodes ei ∀𝑖 ∈
𝑛 consists of the players in 𝑆̅ (listed first) followed by the remaining nodes in
the ECA (sorted in increasing order of distance from PT). A = max ei is the
distance of the player with the largest distance from the PT. An inverse linear
distribution can be identified using the variable xi = A – ei, where each f i (pigim)
is proportional to xi.
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𝑓𝑖 = 𝛼𝑥𝑖
𝑛

∑

𝑓𝑖 = 𝑇

𝑖=1

After substitutions of fi and xi, the formula becomes
𝑛

𝛼∑

𝐴 − 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑇

𝑖=1

Further simplification, results in
𝑛

𝛼(𝑛𝐴 − ∑

𝑒𝑖 ) = 𝑇

𝑖=1

Solving for 𝛼 yields
𝛼=

𝑇
𝑛𝐴 − 𝑬

where E is the sum of all distances.
So, the SINR of each player in the given ECA is expected to be
𝑓𝑖 =

𝑇
(𝐴 − 𝑒𝑖 )
𝑛𝐴 − 𝑬

𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 =

𝑇
(𝐴 − 𝑒𝑖 )
𝑛𝐴 − 𝑬

Therefore, 𝑑𝑖∗ is afforded the highest transmit power in order to maximize Ui (p).
The outcome for a given game is Pareto optimal if it is not possible for all
the players to improve their payoffs by collectively agreeing to choose a strategy
different from the Nash equilibrium. In other words, one player’s payoff cannot
be improved without making another player’s payoff less.
Lemma 2: The Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal if and only if the power
threshold is reached at any given link along the path.
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Proof:

Suppose there exists a path D = (𝑣1 , …, 𝑣𝑖 , …, 𝑣𝑘 ).

If the power

constraint is not tight at each link (𝑣𝑘 , 𝑣𝑘+1 ), then any player may choose to
deviate from such a cooperatively agreed-upon strategy in order to improve
their payoff at the group’s expense. That is, at each link there exists a power
vector p = (𝑝1, …, 𝑝𝑖 , …, 𝑝𝑛 ).

If any player chooses to increase its transmit

power by some factor 𝜃, its SINR will also be increased. This would also result
in a new power vector p′ = (𝑝1′ , … , 𝑝𝑖′ , … , 𝑝𝑛′ ) and a new path D′. However, this
increase by a single player causes
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 = 𝑇 + 𝜃 (17)
which violates the ITT and causes the player with the highest power (i.e. the
player chosen to establish a link based on the inverse linear distribution) to be
backed off.

This Pareto optimal outcome describes a social optimal in the

sense that no individual player can improve its payoff without making at least
one other player worse off.
3.4.9. Performance of Nash Equilibrium
Now, let’s consider the performance of the Nash equilibrium.

Pareto

optimal implies social optimal in our system which in turn results in a tight
power constraint. Therefore,
𝑝𝑔

𝑈𝑖 (𝑝𝑖 ) = 𝑙𝑛 𝑇− 𝑝 𝑔𝑖 𝑖𝑚+ 𝜎 .
𝑖 𝑖𝑚

𝑚

Denote 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑚 , the system optimization problem can be presented by a
constrained maximization
constrained by ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑇.

problem.

We want to maximize

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑈𝑖 (𝑓𝑖 ),

Using the Lagrangian multiplier, we have the

following equations:
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𝑓

𝑖
𝐿(𝑓𝑖 , 𝜆) = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑈𝑖 (𝑓𝑖 ) − 𝜆(∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖 − 𝑇) = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑙𝑛 𝑇−𝑓 −𝜎
− 𝜆(∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖 − 𝑇).
𝑖

𝑚

The first order derivative of the optimal point
𝑛

𝑑𝐿(𝑓𝑖 , 𝜆)
(𝑇 − 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜎𝑚 )(𝑇 − 2𝑓𝑖 + 𝜎𝑚 )
=∑
− 𝜆𝑛 = 0.
𝑑𝑓𝑖
𝑓𝑖 (𝑇 − 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜎𝑚 )2
𝑖=1

Since an inverse linear distribution is used here, it is immediate to see that
𝑇

𝑓𝑖 = 𝑛𝐴−𝐸 (𝐴 − 𝑒𝑖 ), because ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑇.

Based on the first order condition, the

system utility is obviously continuous. The second order derivative satisfies
𝑑 2 𝐿(𝑓𝑖 , 𝜆)
< 0;
𝑑(𝑓𝑖 )2
therefore, 𝑈𝑖 (𝑝𝑖 ) is concave.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1. Introduction
This chapter reports the research methodology that was employed to
address the research questions and to test the research propositions.

The

simulation environment is described here in detail. This dissertation focuses
on a need to understand the social networking aspect of relay selection in
cognitive radio networks. It aims to determine if humanistic behavior patterns
may be applied to forming a successful communication chain in CRNs.
4.2. Research Methodology
In order to address the first research question, “Is the newly proposed
reputation-based model comparable to existing trust schemes?”, the
average trust values of randomly chosen nodes using the RBPCG are compared
to the existing CONFIDANT and Information Theoretic schemes presented in
[39].
To address the second research question, “How is the quality-ofservice (QoS) for primary users affected by incorporating the proposed
game-theoretic approach to network formation?”, a number of simulations
were conducted to analyze the probability that a PT-PR pair will be able to get
into cooperation with a set of relays (i.e. the probability of establishing a path)
that improves its SINR. The details of the simulation environment are outlined
in the next sections.
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For the third research question, “Can network constructions derived
from social network models predict actual linkages in a cooperative multihop relaying network?”, a number of simulations were conducted to analyze
the use of the Latent Space in predicting relay selection. The details of the
simulation environment are outlined in the next section.
Transition matrices were generated for each scenario conducted during
simulation that identify probability measures that a given user will be chosen
during any given round of play, based on observations from 100 rounds of
play.

In the n x n matrix, senders are represented as rows, and one-hop

neighbors are represented as columns, for any given network. The grand mean
frequency for each sender’s one-hop neighbors is an entry in the transition
matrix. Output from the simulations was analyzed by overlay plots.
For the final research question, “What is the current use of social
networking theory and social capital to predict relay selection in
cognitive
performed.

radio

networks?”,

a

comprehensive

review

of

literature is

Detailed comparisons and contrasts will be provided of the

findings.
4.3. Simulation Environment
We consider a multi-channel primary wireless network based on WiMAX
(Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), with multiple SUs assisting
PUs on the uplink. This research proposes a technique that serves as an addon component to the existing primary network and is opportunistically
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harvested.

It does not call for major change in the existing primary

infrastructure, and therefore is of great practical interest.
WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) refers to the
interoperable implementations of a wireless communications standard (IEEE
802.16). WiMAX is similar to WiFi, but on a much larger scale and at faster
speeds. 802.11 has ranges up to about 820ft and 54Mbps, while 802.16 has
ranges up to about 40 miles and 70Mbps.

802.16’s primary application is

broadband wireless access. In contrast, 802.11 is intended for wireless local
area networks (LANs). The bandwidth and range of WiMAX make it suitable for
providing “portable mobile broadband connectivity across cities and countries
through a variety of devices” [58]. WiMAX has the potential to do to broadband
Internet access what cell phones have done to phone access. It operates on the
same general principle as WiFi, sending data from one computer to another
using radio signals. [59]
The WiMAX module provided by ns-3 provides a MAC and PHY level
implementation of the 802.16 standard with point-to-multipoint mode and a
wirelessMAN-OFDMA PHY layer.

The figure below shows the WiMAX

architecture.
In this infrastructure, the uplink scheduler at the base station decides
which of the secondary users will be assigned uplink allocations based on the
QoS parameters associated with the RBPCG. When a service flow is created,
the uplink schedule calculates necessary parameters based on the QoS
requirements.
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Figure 5: WiMAX Architecture [60]
4.4. Simulation Parameters
The existing WiMAX module in ns-3 will be used as the control group.
There will be two primary base stations. To check the impact of the number of
relays, we will uniformly deploy 5, 20, 100, 200, 500, and 1000 secondary
users within the network. A network graph G is randomly generated for each
scenario.

This network graph identifies each user’s one-hop neighbors and

their distances from each other, along with the primary base station that it is
in the vicinity of. The interference temperature threshold (ITT) is 11dB for a
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network on the 2.5GHz frequency band, using 16QAM (1/2) modulation. The
threshold of the number of rounds of plays for each network is 100.
We investigate the performance of the RBPCG based on the following
performance metrics:


the average packet loss,



the ratio of transmissions with improved SINR from cooperative
communication,



the average SINR of direct transmissions compared to the average
effective SINR,



the minimum edit distances,



the average path length, and



the standard deviations of the mean SINR .
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS
5.1. Introduction
This chapter reports the findings and statistical results for the
dissertation.

Various analyses were performed in this study.

JMP® 11.2.0

statistical software was used in the numerical experiments.
5.2. Analysis of Research Question 1
Let’s consider the first proposition: “The new distributed, game-theoretic
approach to relay selection in CRNs, using trustworthiness as social capital, is
comparable to existing trust schemes”.

In [39], Pai et al. discussed the

Information Theoretic scheme and the CONFIDANT scheme.

Both of these

trust mechanisms have been proposed in wireless ad hoc networks. In these
schemes, a trust value, also called a direct trust value, is assigned by node i to
node j as a function of a history of positive and negative interactions with that
node.

The Information Theoretic scheme using the binary entropy function

∑𝑥 𝑝(𝑥)logp(x) to update the direct trust values. The CONFIDANT scheme uses
a beta probability function

𝛼
𝛼+ 𝛽

to update the direct trust values.

The reputation-based trust model for the RBPCG also uses a beta
probability function; however, it takes into account both alpha and beta
vectors, along with consideration of ITT violations.

In order to compare the

RBPCG scheme with the Information Theoretic and CONFIDANT schemes, the
trust value of nodes was observed and recorded after the 100 rounds of game
play. Various confidence levels were used in order to aid in the comparison.
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The subjects of one such comparison are listed below.


node 2 from the 5-node network



node 13 from the 20-node network



node 24 from the 100-node network



node 99 from the 200-node network



node 200 from the 500-node network



node 682 from the 1000-node network

The table below offers a visual comparison of the subjects’ final trust value.
These values are based on observations from all one-hop neighbors.
It is evident from this table that the trust values assigned using the
Information

Theoretic

scheme,

decrease

much

slower

than

both

the

CONFIDANT and RBPCG schemes. The RBPCG trust model is comparable to
the CONFIDANT trust mechanism with average trust values differing from
0.0001 to 0.02. This theoretical trust model is the framework used to analyze
the research questions and propositions.
5.3. Analysis of Research Question 2
The research question, “How is the quality-of-service (QoS) for primary
users affected by incorporating the proposed game-theoretic approach to
network formation?”, was investigated by comparing various network metrics.
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Table 1: Trust Scheme Comparisons
#
Nodes
5

20

100

200

500

1000

Trust Threshold
CONFIDANT
Information
Theoretic
New Scheme

0.3

0.5

0.7

0.7011

0.7014

0.7014

0.9144

0.9144

0.9144

0.7010

0.7011

0.7011

CONFIDANT
Information
Theoretic
New Scheme

0.8736

0.8736

0.8736

0.9090

0.9090

0.9090

0.8527

0.8527

0.8527

CONFIDANT
Information
Theoretic
New Scheme

0.6881

0.6882

0.6882

0.7215

0.7215

0.7215

0.6867
0.7477

0.6867
0.7477

0.6867
0.7477

0.8220
0.7333
0.8961

0.8221
0.7333
0.8961

0.8221
0.7333
0.8961

0.9722
0.8880
0.8419

0.9722
0.8880
0.8420

0.9722
0.8880
0.8420

0.9254
0.8363

0.9254
0.8363

0.9254
0.8363

CONFIDANT
Information
Theoretic
New Scheme
CONFIDANT
Information
Theoretic
New Scheme
CONFIDANT
Information
Theoretic
New Scheme

A number of simulations were conducted to determine if the newly
proposed algorithm is comparable in performance to the existing infrastructure
and to analyze the probability that a PT-PR pair will be able to get into
cooperation with a set of relays (i.e. the probability of establishing a path) that
improve its SINR.
The figure below describes the ratio of packet loss. Packet loss varies
based on details of the data transmission including, but not limited to,
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modulation and coding. The red line represents the system without RBPCG,
and the blue line represents with RBPCG. There is a slight decrease in packet
loss

with

the

RBPCG.

This

may

be

attributed

to

the

cooperative

communication employed by RBPCG that affords higher SINR to relays
agreeing to assist the primary users. Higher SINR guarantees a better signal at
the receiver.

Figure 6: Packet Loss Without RBPCG versus With RBPCG
The next figure demonstrates the percent of transmissions (i.e. rounds of
game play) that utilized cooperative communication and, therefore, the primary
users enjoyed a higher payoff.

It is evident from the research that this

improvement decreases as the number of nodes increases.
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Figure 7: Ratio of Transmissions with Improved SINR
Consider Figure 8. Here, the bilinear model, fitted to a cubic polynomial
function with Rsquare of 0.918, appears to show that the average SINR enjoyed
by primary users in direct transmissions is a good predictor of the effective
SINR enjoyed by the same users using cooperative communication. However,
the average effective SINR is slightly lower than that of direct transmissions.
5.4. Analysis of Research Question 3
Due to the overlapping conceptualizations between cognitive radio
networks and social network theory, a social network model was applied to the
relay selection problem. The third proposition states “The latent space model
[32] may be applied in CRNs to predict relay selection”.

Logistic regression

analysis was used to explore the applicability of the Latent Space model to
relay selection in cognitive radio networks.
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Figure 8: Average SINR of DTs Compared to Average Effective SINR
In this social network model, Hoff et al. provide a probability measure
over unobserved characteristics of a social network in which the presence of a
tie between two individuals is dependent on the presence of other ties. In other
words, the observation of i → j and j → k suggests that i and k are not too far
apart in social space.
[32] uses the log odds function to estimate unobserved ties.

In the

cognitive radio network scenario, the log odds model can be used to construct a
Markov chain.

A Markov chain can be described as a set of states

Z = {Z0, Z1, …, Zr}, where Z0 is the start state. 𝑍̂ = {Zi, …, Zh} is the set of states
where the Euclidean distance from the current state is 1, and h is the number
of one-hop neighbors for a given user. The basic algorithm is to reiterate the
steps below. The process described is initiated by the primary transmitter.
1. Using Z0

=

𝑍̂ as a starting state. Construct a Markov chain over

model parameters as follows:
66

a. for all i : h
i. Z′ = arg max Q(i, a)
b. Accept Z′ with probability ℙ(Ri|a), where ℙ(Ri|a) is the value
from the transition matrix.
2. Repeat this process using the node selected in step 2.
Here, Q is the value of the log odds function with i and a providing indexes into
the corresponding transition matrix.
In each case, the Latent Space model [32] can eventually predict the
actual path for each network with 100% accuracy.

Table 2 provides the

minimum edit distance (Levenshtein distance) between the actual path and the
predicted path for each network.

The minimum edit distance is a way of

quantifying how different two strings are to one another by counting the
minimum number of operations (insert, delete, and substitute) required to
transform one string into the other. The prediction is 100% accurate to the
stable path at the completion of the 100th round. In other words, the minimum
edit distance is zero at the end of each game. This is true in all scenarios,
across all networks.
The figure that demonstrates the average path length clearly shows that
the average path length increases as the number of nodes in the network
increases. This can be expected as the density of users increases in a given
effective communication area. Therefore, a growth in the number of secondary
users willing to cooperate with primary users is demonstrated.
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Table 2: Minimum Edit Distances for All Games
Set
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

5 Nodes
2
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

20 Nodes
4
5
3
5
4
4
0
0
0
0

100 Nodes
12
10
6
6
2
0
0
0
0
0

200 Nodes
15
10
6
4
4
2
0
0
0
0

500 Nodes
8
8
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

1000
Nodes
10
10
7
3
0
0
0
0
0
0

Figure 9: Average Path Length
The next figure shows the standard deviation of the average SINR of each
network scenario. The mean comparisons are between the network scenarios
with and without the reputation-based power control game. It’s obvious that
there is little variation in the data sets.
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SINR Comparisons
18
16

Mean SINR

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
5 Nodes

20 Nodes

100 Nodes

200 Nodes

500 Nodes

1000 Nodes

Number of Nodes

Figure 10: SINR Comparisons
5.5. Analysis of Research Question 4
To address the last research question, “What is the current use of social
networking theory and social capital to predict relay selection in cognitive radio
networks?”, an exhaustive review of literature was conducted for research
related to using social network models as a tool to predict relay selection in
CRNs. This search has shown a severe inadequacy of research in this area. As
noted in Section 2.3.3, [29], [35], [39], [40], and [43] have conducted research
on using SNT in CRNs related to discovering dynamic spectrum access,
behavior propagation, bidirectional ties, and mobility. To my best knowledge,
this research is the first to study the use of social network models to predict
relay selection in cognitive radio networks.

This is one of the major

contributions of this dissertation.
The table below identifies the literature discovered that is relevant to
social network theory and social capital in cognitive radio networks.
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Table 3: SNT and CRNs Literature Review
Title

Behavior Propagation in Cognitive Radio
Networks: A Social Network Approach

Date of
Publication

Authors

SNT and CRN
Research?

Relevant to
Relay
Selection?

Contributions
Studied social behavior
propagation in CRNs by applying
the model of interacting particles

2014

Li, Song, Chen, Lai,
Qiu

Yes

No

Improving the Community Behavior of Social
Network Theory Based Mobility Model for
MANET

2008

Gunasekaran,
Nagarajan

Yes

No

Trust-aware Resource Allocation in a Cognitive
Radio System

2012

Qin, Leung, Miao,
Chen

Yes

No

Trust-based Data Fusion Mechanism Design in
Cognitive Radio Networks

2014

Wang and Chen

Yes

No

Using Social Network Theory Towards
Development of Wireless Ad hoc Network
Trust

2007

Pai, Roosta, Wicker,
Sastry

Yes

No
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Proposed a mobility model to
detect the movement of nodes
Developed a mechanism where
trustworthiness is used as social
capital to improve radio
spectrum utilization
Developed a trust-based data
aggregation scheme to enhance
spectrum sensing capabilities
Proposed a trust-based scheme
that uses balance theory to
predict bidirectional ties among
users

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This research examined the applicability of social networking and social
capital theories in the context of cognitive radio networks’ ability to predict
users’ intentions in network formation, a technique that could be utilized in
many real world scenarios. A major concern in CRNs is relay selection in a
distributed, multi-hop environment. The cooperation between the primary and
secondary users is critical to accomplish this. Cognitive users are similar to
humans in social networks as they can sense their environment, make
decisions based on observations, and act on these decisions.
These similarities allow cognitive radio networks to be likened to online
communities.

The social phenomena underlying online communities can be

directly related to network formation. Research in building, discovering and
analyzing online communities is increasingly important as the Internet
becomes the largest collection of ideas, personalities, and cultures in history.
These communities represent groups of individuals connected by some social
relation, such as a trusted contact link in a business network, a family
relationship, or a collegiate organization.
In this dissertation, a novel network formation game is applied to form a
multi-hop path between a primary transmitter and its receiver, employing
secondary users as relays. It also focused on a need to understand the social
networking aspect of relay selection in cognitive radio networks.

One of its

main contributions is that it provides empirical data showing that a social
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network model may be applied to predicting relay selection in cognitive radio
networks.
This research has shown that this technique has not been applied
previously to relay selection in cognitive radio networks.

Table 3 shows

evidence of studies that applied social network theory to cognitive radio
networks. None of these studies used it in relay selection.
Table 4 provides a summary of the results of the research propositions.
As with all research, the current study has certain limitations. They include
the following:


Small sample size,



Theoretical study as opposed to field study, and



Use of a social network model not specifically designed to evaluate
the field of cognitive radio networks.

An overall recommendation is to continue research that leads to the
improvement of the RBPCG algorithm and tests the applicability of more social
network models to relay selection in cognitive radio networks.
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Table 4: Summary of Results
Propositions

Results

P1: The new distributed, gametheoretic approach to relay selection in
CRNs, using trustworthiness as social
capital, is comparable to current trust
schemes.

The
reputation-based
technique
introduced here decreases at a faster
rate than the Information Theoretic
scheme and the CONFIDANT schemes.

P2: The QoS enjoyed by primary users The rate of packet loss is slightly lower
is improved by using secondary users to after the RBPCG is introduced.
transmit primary data.
The
average
effective
SINR
of
cooperative communication is slightly
lower than that of direct transmissions.
P3: The latent space model [32] may be The latent space model [32] may be
applied in CRNs to predict relay applied to relay selection and provided
selection.
100% accuracy of prediction to stable
paths.
P4: This research presents the first This is the first study of the
solution to using social networking applicability
of
social
networking
theories in relay selection for cognitive theories in relay selection for CRNs.
radio networks.
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